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Economic Impacts of Rules-based versus Risk-based Cybersecurity Regulations in 
Critical Infrastructure Providers (Bulk Electricity Providers)i 
Fabio Massacci (IEEE Member), Raminder Ruprai, Matthew Collinson, Julian Williams  
 
Abstract: 
Policy makers are currently proposing new regulatory mechanisms to enhance the security of critical national 
infrastructure operators. The key question in this scenario is which is the right way to regulate the cybersecurity 
of critical infrastructure operators in charge of electricity transmission? Should optimal cybersecurity regulation 
follow a US style, mostly ‘rules-based’ model, or the European and in particular UK approach, which is mostly a 
‘risk-based’, from the perspective of the firm, or a savvier balance of both? 
We discuss the economic issues behind this choice and present a cyber-security economics model for public 
policy in presence of strategic attackers. We have calibrated these models in the field with the support of 
National Grid, the main operator in the UK and one of the largest operators on the East Coast of US. The model( 
shows that phase transitions for optimal choices are present: e.g. when incentives have a given combination 
operators will stop investing in their own risk assessment and only care about compliance (and viceversa). It 
suggest that different approaches may be appropriate to different conditions (e.g. number of operators and the 
ability to audit), and that just pushing for more rules may have unintended consequences. 
1. Introduction 
Incidents of Cyber-crime are typically associated with fraudulent activities exploiting the 
(in)security of credit card payment schemes or on-line transactions1. When these occurrences 
have affected individual citizens it has been normally attributed to the effort of criminal 
hackers who infect millions of computers for the purpose of gaining access to information 
relating to personal financial assets.2 3 Over time, the victims may change, but the general 
modality of the crime, monetization by manipulation of transactions, is inherently similar. 
Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) did not have a specific modality attached to 
them, at least publicly. This changed in 2009 with the deployment of the Stuxnet malware. 
Targeted attacks from nation states and criminal organizations have subsequently become 
more common; or at least more widely reported in as being persistent. These activities, often 
termed Advanced Persistent Threats, have affected many CNIs from aviation to water 
processing utilities. Energy operators are not exempt and TABLE 1 illustrates some examples 
of recent recorded attacks. 
The increasing number of cybersecurity issues has now spurred the attention of public policy 
makers. The US Federal Government (Executive Order 13636) has put forward regulations 
aimed at protecting the cybersecurity of CNIs and translated them into a substantive technical 
framework4. The European Union has followed suit with a proposal for a specific European 
Directive in this area.  
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TABLE 1 - Examples of Cyber Attack to Energy Providers 
Name Target Details 
Stuxnet Damage Bespoke sophisticated malware targeting the nuclear enrichment plants in Iran. 
Duqu Exfiltration Targeted malware used to infiltrate and extract key pieces of information about 
ICS for the purposes of reconnaissance. 
Shamoon Damage and 
exfiltration 
A virus used to exfiltrate data from a host machine before deleting the 
computer’s master-boot-record to render the computer useless. Shamoon was 
used to attack the oil company Saudi-Aramco where 30,000 of it’s desktops 
were infected and subsequently knocked out as the virus took hold. 
Havex, 
Energetic Bear, 
Dragonfly 
Exfiltration Focussed malware targeting ICS/SCADA systems in the energy sector for the 
purposes of exfiltrating data for cyber espionage and/or possible use in a future 
cyber attack.  
Regin Exfiltration Sophisticated malware designed to target and collect intelligence within the 
infected systems for use by nation states. 
Managing and regulating cybersecurity issues is particularly relevant for CNI Operators 
(CNIOs), private or publicily traded enterprises in charge of the bulk transmission of 
electricity, oil- production and processing or gas- production and distribution. 
Hence, a natural research question arises: “which is the best way to regulate the cybersecurity 
of CNI providers?” As with most important questions, the answer is not straightforward. To 
answer this question a useful conceptual distinction focuses on who is responsible for the 
choice of security measures.  
At one extreme, which we refer to as a “rules-based regulations”, the policy maker mandates 
security provisions for CNIOs by detailed compliance requirements and introduce penalties 
for non-compliance with those requirements.  On the opposite side, referred to as “risk-based 
regulations”, the policy maker intervenes with fines consequential to security breaches but let 
firms define security investments based on their investment profile, their own risk 
assessment analysis, and the potential losses (including ultimately the loss of license to 
operate). As an illustrative example, in a pure rules-based system only the policy-maker 
performs the risk assessment (possibly after a consultation as a US NERC type system for 
interstate bulk transmission),  casts security measures into low-level rules and audits their 
implementation by CNIOs, fining them for non-compliance. If all rules are met but a breach 
nonetheless occurs CNIOs are not liable. In a pure risk-based system, the CNIO itself is 
responsible for performing a risk assessment, deciding the low level countermeasures, and it 
is not audited. Instead, penalties, are imposed in the event of a successful attack that causes 
disruptions (the UK regulatory system works in the this fashion).  
Real-world regulations are normally “hybrid” between the two extremes and the operational 
implementation of security controls by a CNIO is a function of the risk environment and the 
actual regulations.  
During the SECONOMICS project (http://www.seconomics.org), we have developed a number 
of cyber-security public-policy models that capture explicitly the hybrid nature of regulations 
oscillating between risk-based and rules-based systems. We have calibrated and validated our 
regulatory models in the field with the support of National Grid, the electricity provider in the 
UK and in part of the East Cost of the US.  The key feature of the model is that we can 
determine whether a rules-based or a risk-based regulation obtain the best social optimum 
for the public policy makers, even under the assumption that CNIOs pursue their own 
commercial interests as privately own companies. 
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From our parametric specification, the model predicts that substantial variations in the 
regulatory system maybe appropriate to different conditions. For instance, the number of 
operators, the effectiveness of audits, the appropriateness of requirements by the policy 
maker and the cost of attacks all influence the optimal outcome. What is particularly 
interesting is a qualitative phenomenon: the presence of discrete phase transitions. Different 
types of incentives by the regulator dramatically shift the behaviour of CNIOs and not 
necessarily in the anticipated manner. 
2. Challenges in CNI Cyber Security 
CNIOs have a variety of assets with differing levels of criticality to the ongoing functionality 
and profitability of their operations. In the case of electricity transmission, the critical assets 
for service could include the energy management system and software and essential 
operational technology in the field such as local substation control systems. Critical systems 
that include Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS). ICS and SCADA systems control the core (critical) functions and 
operations that CNIOs are responsible for. The role of SCADA systems is to take information 
from multiple remote sensors/stations and fed it into a central control room where the 
operators have full visibility of the entire network being managed. The ICS is then linked to 
the SCADA system through both automated and manual control where actions and control 
changes can be made from the information that is collated and organised from the SCADA 
system. Examples of ICS and SCADA systems include electricity and gas management systems 
run by the transmission grid operators, such as National Grid or a city’s train metro control 
system, such as the London Underground. Over recent years, the cyber security agenda in 
ICS/SCADA systems has gained greater traction. TABLE 2 illustrate examples of new 
initiatives over traditional IT Security. 
TABLE 2 - Examples of Specific Initiatives in CNI  Cyber Security 
Acronym Type Details 
ISA/IEC 
62443 
Specific Standard International Society of Automation (ISA)/ International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC) standards on the cyber security of 
industry automation and control systems 
GICSP Professional certification Certification in Global Industrial Cyber Security Professional 
SCSIE Information Exchange UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 
SCADA and Controls Systems Information Exchange  
The number of high-profile incidents we have listed in TABLE 1 have helped to sharpen the 
senses of security teams in CNIOs and their Boards. The Stuxnet incident was the first major 
cyber attack to an ICS/SCADA system.  Stuxnet was a piece of bespoke malware, targeted at 
Iran’s Nuclear programme. Its specific purpose was to corrupt the Siemens’ SIMATIC WinCC 
SCADA system that was used to control the centrifuges. A key feature of the Stuxnet malware 
was its ability to intercept and then alter sensor readings from the centrifuges to the control 
room and commands being sent back without the operators realising that anything untoward 
had occurred. This resulted in the malfunction of the centrifuges and batches of uranium 
being ruined which was the ultimate goal of the attack.  
Stuxnet-like malware are highly dangerous, because they are capable of both affecting 
computer systems across a network and they are capable of causing physical damage to 
critical equipment through attacking the ICS and SCADA systems directly. Further, ICS and 
SCADA systems traditionally have a far longer lifecycle (15-20 years) than standard IT 
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equipment. As a result, these legacy systems were often built at a time when 
information/cyber security was not considered as an important corporate issue. Even today 
ICS and SCADA vendors are still relatively security immature, which makes securing the 
systems a difficult proposition for the CNIOs.5  
There are other assets that might need to be secured, as in other industries, by they are not 
essential to the critical service and can be categorized as supporting the functioning of that 
service, often with the goal of ensuring the service is profitably managed (even in the case of 
state provided transmission systems). For example, users’ laptops and HR and finance 
systems and their applications are not critical to transmission, but ensure that the service is 
efficiently managed. 
Regulators have realized that the security of CNI systems is not at the level of security 
maturity where they would want them to be (e.g. see ENISA’s recent report6) but have often 
difficulty in fully comprehending and appreciating the challenges CNIOs have to overcome in 
securing the legacy ICS and SCADA systems.   
Further, major economics drivers create additional obstacles. In the EU, CNIOs are heavily 
price regulated often due to the monopolistic (or oligopolistic) nature of the energy 
transmission industry. Therefore, it can be difficult for CNIOs to justify significant security 
budgets to a regulator that is tasked with keeping prices as low as possible. In the US, price 
competition over a compliance target between a large number of operators returns essentially 
the same effect. This is one of the key reasons as to why cyber security budgets in many CNIOs 
are not as high as other similarly sized commercial organizations and maybe inadequate to 
properly secure ICS and SCADA systems. 
As a final challenge is there is also significant variation amongst contemporary security 
regulations which span the entire spectrum from risk-based to rule-based regimes, set in 
place by national governments. 
3. Different Approaches to CNI Cybersecurity Regulations 
Should CNI Operators (CNIOs for short) in charge of electricity transmission be regulated based 
on risk-based regime or a rule-base regime? The public policy implications of this question 
cross the Atlantic: should an optimal cybersecurity regulation follow the US, rule-based 
model, or the UK, risk-based model? Which market conditions or which attacker model 
justifies one choice over the other or suggests a mixture of both? 
In the US, National Grid, for interstate bulk electricity transmission, is required to adhere to a 
rules-based system for security, run by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC). NERC is an independent organisation that provides guidelines and standards for 
electricity transmission operators in North America and enforces reliability standards on 
electricity transmission operators in the US on behalf of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). NERC monitors the status of various elements of the power distribution 
system (including cyber security assets). The standards which focus on information/cyber 
security as well as the CNI aspects of electricity transmission are the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) reliability standards. Each regulated entity has to provide compliance reports 
against the CIP standard on a yearly basis and is audited every three years.  The first CIP 
standard mandating asset identification (CIP-002 v1) was drafted in 2006. Version 2 went 
into force in 2010. 
In contrast, the majority of cyber security regulation in CNI industries across Europe is not 
compliance-based. In the UK, National Grid holds a licence to transmit electricity that is 
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granted by the UK government’s Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). The 
headline duty of the transmission licence holder within the Electricity Act of 1989 states that 
“It shall be the duty of the holder of a licence authorising him to transmit electricity to develop 
and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of electricity transmission[…].” 
The Electricity Act does not specifically require the licence holder to be “secure”, but not 
having the relevant cyber security controls in place may jeopardise the electricity 
transmission in case of cyber-attacks and therefore the licence itself. The operator is then free 
to decide how they will ensure they are cyber-secure. The regulation is risk-based. 
Looking beyond the regulatory environments in the UK and US, TABLE 3 illustrates the 
difference in regulations between some countries in Europe and USA that we obtained from a 
survey of the cybersecurity group members of ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity). 
TABLE 3 – Regulatory Regime in Different Countries 
Type of Regulation Applicable Countries 
Mostly risk-based  Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Risk-based with some rules-based Austria, Poland, Germany 
Rules-based with some risk-based France 
Mostly rules-based USA 
Regimes can change over time. As an example, the German regulatory system for security of 
critical industries like electricity transmission is currently based on high-level principles. The 
German Federal Ministry for the Interior will be establishing a requirement for utilities to 
obtain an ISO27001 certification (a security standard). Part of the new regulation includes 
security audits and the ‘right to inspect’ by the regulator. Whilst the ISO27001 standard 
includes a risk management framework, several security controls are effectively mandatory. 
These can be viewed as specific rules in addition to the headline rule to be certified to that 
standard. This is a jump from a mainly risk-based to a mainly rules-based regulatory system. 
In an additional example of the changing regulatory landscape, the European Commission has 
put forward the European Network and Information Security (NIS) directive6 to ensure that 
CNIOs meet appropriate IT security standards, share information about threats, report 
incidents an security breaches in a consistent manner across Europe. The proposed 
mandatory requirements within the NIS directive have been received with the full spectrum 
of responses because cyber security maturity varies widely in the different EU member states. 
Some are in favour of the directive, as it would aid in pushing CNIOs to do more in security 
thereby increasing their overall security maturity. Other EU member countries have concerns 
that the compliance-based nature of the directive could stall existing good relationships 
between governments and CNIOs.  For instance, requirements for mandatory incident 
reporting may drive CNIOs to hide/tone down security events for fear of further 
repercussions or reputational consequences. 
National Grid owns and operates the UK’s electricity and gas transmission networks and 
provides gas distribution for around half of the UK. National Grid also owns and operates 
electricity and gas transmission networks, as well as distribution networks, in a significant 
proportion of the North Eastern United States. Due to this coverage of providing utility 
delivery services in the UK and US National Grid Security function deals with every aspect of 
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both, diametrically opposed, regulatory regimes. Therefore, this has provided a fruitful case 
study opportunity in analysing the risk versus rules based regulatory mechanisms. 
4. Current Security Economics Models don’t apply to CNI scenarios 
Traditional security economics models have captured attacker—target interactions as 
Bayesian games, early work that builds on the ‘weakest link’ game have predominated in this 
area7. Fultz and Grossklags8 use the classic paradigm of defenders and attackers, playing a one 
period game under various assumptions for the attacker objectives and constraints on the 
defenders technology and actions. Earlier papers use a slightly simplified model of attack and 
defense to determine the optimal allocation of liability to vendors for software patching9. A 
similar, single period game elucidates the optimal policy for software vulnerability 
disclosures10. The behavioral aspects of attacker-target interactions can also determine how 
much information is optimal to share11. 
Why is it important to differentiate between CNI firms, which are regulated in some manner, 
and those in other less regulated sectors such as technology and retail? The answer lies 
primarily in the systemic risk that accompanies the ‘critical good’ that the CNIO is providing. 
At first, there is usually one bulk electricity transmitter for a European country (or a US or 
Canadian state) as the geographical spacing restricts competition. Second, CNIOs are now run 
as `normal’ firms, often quoted in the stock exchange and thus run with the same overarching 
objective as any other firm: maximizing the present value of shareholders interest. Corporate 
officers who make decisions for a firm would be expected to exhibit risk-aversion in acting for 
themselves12 but the theory of the firm suggests that corporate officers should act on behalf of 
their shareholders13. We end with a risk-neutral, rent seeking, monopolist in charge of a risky, 
critical service for the society. Therefore, to avoid the exploitation of its own citizens, a 
government agency normally regulates in some way the degree of investments made by the 
CNIO and limits the charges paid by customers. The `price cap’ model is a UK system that sets 
a maximum cost of the good. An alternative model, used in the USA, is a `rate-of-return’ 
regulation that limits utilities to a maximum rate-of-return on capital for investors. 
This complicates the standard attack-defense game in several directions. At first, unlike in the 
standard target firm versus attackers, the major costs of successful attacks are often not fully 
borne by the CNIO, but by the public at large. To ensure that the CNIO properly invests in 
security provision the policy makers need to balance (i) the resources that they allow the 
operator to extract from the consumers, (ii) the minimal mandated and audited investment, 
and (iii) the penalties and fines for poor service (e.g. in the event of a successful attack).  
Second, given the privatized status of the CNIO form, any transfer from a ‘rate setting 
arrangement’ will be invested to provide the maximum expected surplus for the shareholders 
subject to future risk outcomes. Divergent opinions on the likelihood and impact of future 
successful attacks will lead to a tension between the policy maker and the CNIO on resource 
allocation. For example, if the regulator is uninformed on the costs of security and is 
convinced by the operator to have a large transfer, but then caps the transfer to shareholders, 
the operator will act in an inefficient manner (the Averch-Johnson effect14). 
Finally, finding the appropriate discount rate for future losses in electricity transmission may 
face the same problems discussed in environmental economics and in the economics of 
climate change.  Larger scale ecosystems (such as the Internet or long distance electricity 
grid) are usually assumed to require longer term planning (and therefore low discount rate). 
The social planner may desire the risk externalities of bulk electricity transmission to be 
managed over a longer, more sustainable, time horizon, then his discount rate will be set 
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lower than the normal rate of return of investments determined by a market-driven CNIO. 
Each participants in the ecosystem will therefore struggle against the costs for amortization of 
risk they believe to be unfair given their own time preferences. 
Understanding the security economics of defenders-attackers interaction in such 
(semi)regulated environments is therefore critical. 
5. A Game-theoretic Model of Subsidies and Incentives  
To tell regulatory systems apart from a sound conceptual perspective, we introduce the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) model suggested by Crawford and Ostrom15. 
Similar frameworks with a rigorous mathematical underpinning have also been applied 
elsewhere16. The IAD framework extracts the key features of the institutional design narrative 
(from the hundreds pages of the NERC/FERC regulations or the several acts of European 
governments) and from these features a mathematical model based on game theory can be 
soundly developed. 
Crawford and Ostrom introduced the notion of a policy action arena, which is the domain of 
interactions, e.g. the regulation of cyber security. Within the arena we observe rules, norms 
and strategies. Each macro concept is formally described by a set of refined concepts. An 
attribute (A) is the individual or organization to which the policy institution statement 
applies. The deontic (D) `prescriptive operator’ describes what is ideally permitted, obliged or 
forbidden by the institutional statement. The aim or intention (I) describes the goal or action 
of the statements for which the corresponding deontic refers. The condition (C) specifies when 
and where the aim is appropriate. The or-else (O) is the punishment action when a rule is not 
adhered to. For rules the entire syntax is valid (ADICO), for norms only attribute, deontic, aim 
and condition apply, (ADIC). Strategies include only attribute, aim and condition (AIC). 
The difference between the two regulatory systems is in the entity setting norms and the type 
of or-else punishments. For risk-based systems, the entity contracted for the service 
determines the specificity of the operational norms whilst the public body sets the over-
arching principles with either explicit (ex-post fines for poor or absent service) or implicit 
(loss of licence) punishments. In a rules-based system the public body sets and audits 
operational norms, determining them from its own principles. Hybrid systems vary in the 
degree of discretion the service provider has in setting operational norms and the specificity 
of audit and a-priori fines for breaches of audit, relative to fines for disruption of provision. 
To build a model, we assume that the policy-maker is a single coherent decision-maker, as is 
the CNIO. This is appropriate to characterize monopoly CNI situations, common in EU states 
and in many US states. Another assumption is that CNIOs are responsive to policy actions, 
albeit not necessarily in the way the policy maker expects. 
A CNIO can decide the level of investment in rules compliance Irules and the level of investment 
in risk-based security Irisk. Intuitively, they are the response to the incentives set-out by the 
policy maker. These investments are assumed to be separate and to account for all security 
investments. Thus, compliance investment, whilst it may have the effect of reducing risk, is 
not by itself classified as contributing to risk-based investment. 
The policy-maker set policies represented mathematically as pairs of functions describing the 
strength of incentives for security rules compliance (the result of failing an audit failureAudit) 
and strength of incentives for risk-based security behaviour (punitive damages consequence 
of successful attacks). The policy-maker has a further action available, being the subsidy S 
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allocated to the CNIO. The precise form of this subsidy – for example a consumer fee with 
price or rate-of-return cap, or a direct transfer of funds – is not relevant. 
A specific security aspect is the presence of rational adversaries who benfits from security 
breaches. In some models, breaches are taken to arise stochastically, as though generated by 
some partially unknown process. In the present model, CNIO and attacker simultaneously 
anticipate and react to each other’s choices, where the attacker needs to choose a level of 
attacking intensity A.   
These actors can be characterized to the following risk neutral utility functions: 
Ufirm =  S –Irules -Irisk –failureAudit(Irules) –(fines+losses)×PrAttacks(A,Irules,Irisk)  (1) 
Uattacker = reward×PrAttacks(A,Irules,Irisk) – A       (2) 
Upolicy maker= W – S – lackassurance(Irules) - damages×PrAttacks(A,Irules,Irisk)   (3) 
Equation (1) represents firm pay-off and we can see that they receive a subsidy S and expend 
deterministically investments  Irules and Irisk. When the firm is audited and is found wanting of a 
compliance requirement, it receives a fine  failureAudit(Irules). We assume that this function is 
hyperbolic: it decreases with Irules but the marginal effectiveness of  additional investments 
decreases for large investments. This assumption is typical for models of choice under 
uncertainty used in economics from public policy to finance.  
This ensures that the firm chooses an optimal level of Irules at a maxima rather than as a 
boundary condition from an arbitrary budget constraint. For the stochastic loss resulting from 
the term (fines+losses)×PrAttacks(A,Irules,Irisk) we make a similar assumption: the probability of 
successful attacks is hyperbolic in the plane of Irules and Irisk for a given level of A, and is 
obviously increasing in attacking intensity A. Therefore, success probability decreases with 
the total amount of investments but the marginal effectiveness of each additional dollar 
diminishes for large investments. As a consequence, the firm will choose an optimal level of 
effort Irisk and the contribution of random losses to the choice of Irules attains a unique maxima.   
Equation (2) represents the pay-off of the attacker. We assume that there is a reward and a 
cost of effort (rolled into the value A). Given the previous assumptions on PrAttacks(A,I1,I2) then 
the also attacker will have an optimal unique intensity for attacks. The major issue arises from 
a lack of empirical measures of A and reward. At present we can only view attacks that have 
occurred and so we do not know the full set of available attacks or have a measure of their 
difficulty. However, we can treat the unknown parameters as variables for parameter 
explorations and this provides us with the policy domains of interest. 
Equation (3) presents the policy-makers risk-neutral expected pay-off. The policy maker has a 
quantity W of wealth and allocates an amount S. The policy maker receives verifiable 
assurance from the firm by the expenditure of Irules and this level of assurance is proportional 
to the level of investment by the firm. The lackassurance(Irules) captures this effect, as the level of 
Irules increases then lackassurance(Irules) converges to zero; whilst as Irules tends to zero, the term 
lackassurance(Irules) tends to a fixed value that represents the overall concern of the policy-maker 
in the absence of verifiable information from the firm. Finally, the term 
damages×PrAttacks(A,Irules,Irisk) denoted the expected degree of damage to society from attacks. 
This term is not directly affected by the policy makers actions, however, it is indirectly 
affected by the choice of function failureAudit(Irules) and the level of fine(s) the policy maker 
imposes on the firm and these are the key policy levers. We denote these levers as the 
incentive for risk-based security investment  and the incentive for rules-based security 
investment. 
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When designing such an attack and defence model, the modeller has to be careful to ensure 
that the unit of account of each agent (attacker, firm corporate officer and policy-maker) are 
separately measured. Equations 1 and 3 In the most general specification the common terms 
(notably the subsidy S and the investments Irules and Irisk) will have multipliers in front of them 
to ensure that the they are evaluated according the unit of account and the level of risk 
aversion of each actor. For example, the policy maker may values the public subsidy S at the 
higher rate than the firm receiving it (for instance when it is obtained directly from taxation). 
At this stage, a general solution would be to build a complex game with three types of player. 
Our simpler and effective alternative is to treat the attacker-target interaction as a sub-game 
with a Nash equilibrium for a given set of incentives. The policy maker will then optimize the 
incentives considering the solution of the Nash equilibrium. The detailed mathematical 
representation of the model can be found in SECONOMICS Deliverable D6.4. 
6. Policy Implications for Security of CNI Operators 
Our models have been built, calibrated and refined in an iterative process through 
involvement with industry security leaders in the energy sector and there are number of 
policy implications that stem from this analysis. 
The interesting phenomenon is that the choices of incentives by the policy maker divide the 
policy arena in regions of behaviour for the CNIO and the attackers. Figure 1a illustrates our 
phase diagram. If the incentives for rule-based compliance are massive, the attacker will 
eventually be priced out (blue line on the right). If the incentive for risk-based self-assessment 
increases and the incentive for rule-based compliance decreases (eg CNIOs can shirk audits, 
or the fines are not high enough) then the regulator should switch to risk-based regulatory 
regimes (the red boundary) so that companies would make their own security risk 
assessment and invest accordingly. Countries listed in TABLE 2 have been positioned in the 
plane according to the incentive structure surveyed from the ENTSO-E cybersecurity group. 
  
In each zone CNIOs react differently to incentives. If 
both are low they do actually nothing. If there is too 
much emphasis on compliance they only invest in 
meeting rules. Otherwise they will do a risk 
assessment and invest to mitigate the critical threats. 
Just adding more rules doesn’t help: the policy makers 
would like to push CNIOs from (1) to (2) and from (5) 
to (6) but since CNIOs only move along the budget 
constraints the actual effect is that (4) stops doing its 
security analysis and only cares about compliance (6). 
Figure 1 - Phase Regions of CNIOs Behavior Depending in Incentives 
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Given the presence of the no-attack region, the policy maker would intuitively like to push 
CNIOs on the right by adding more rules. Unfortunately, the above phase transition diagram 
must be intersected with the actual financial means of the firm, the solid blue line in Figure 
1b, often capped by the regulator itself. Therefore, the push for more rules might have 
unintended consequences: instead of increasing security, the additional rules (eg adding the 
obligation to meet the NIS Directive to the CNIO in (1), or the additional compliance of NIS 
and ISO27001 for the German operator in (4)) will push them to disinvest in the security 
measures they identified as critical and potentially down towards the compliance-only region. 
The qualitative structure of the phase diagram does not change with model parameters but 
the precise value of the optimal policy choice, and the budget constraints depend on them. For 
example, the rate of mitigation returns to investment in rule compliance impacts the position 
of the green line, so different estimations by the firm and the policy-maker may lead to 
different expectations of policy outcomes and potentially damaging misunderstandings. 
Policy-maker and CNIO should have a shared view of the outcome (response by firm and 
attacker) that arise from the policy. 
If we look at US, nearly 400 firms provide bulk electricity transmission services across the 
continent. Their size varies from large, risk mature, multinational corporations (such as 
National Grid) to very small firms operating in sparsely populated areas. Such variation 
determines a corresponding variation in time horizons, risk preferences, and associated 
investment profiles. Externalities created by underinvestment by individual firms can create 
sizeable costs for other CNIOs and the wider public. In this instance, NERC-CIP regulations 
provide state and federal public policy planners a rules-based system designed to provide 
assurance on minimum levels of cross-sectional protection.  
In the EU context, the majority of bulk electricity transmission operators are national entities. 
The need of a coordinated regulatory regimes NERC-style appears to be fundamentally 
different as the problem of externalities is smaller in this environment. If the interconnection 
between European countries, and the number or maturity of operators would change 
significantly in the future this approach should need to reconsidered. 
Below we present some of the high-level reflections stemming from validation meetings:  
 The effectiveness of a rules-based regulation depends on how well informed the 
regulator is of the security of key assets. If IT architectures differ across each 
organisation it will be difficult for a regulator to precisely state in the regulation which 
assets are subject to security requirements. So, CNIOs may exploit gaps in the 
regulation and substitute the use of regulated assets (subject to security rules) with 
unregulated ones (thus subject to no rule), hence lowering the overall security of the 
system. 
 A regulator’s payoff depends on what it values as important. If a regulator values 
assurance i.e. demonstration of compliance to security rules, their payoff will be higher 
the more stringent the rules and the audits are. This might be particularly important if 
the budget constraint is tight and the risk of ending in the no-action zone is high. If 
regulators value the absence of security incidents to the service provided by the CNIO 
then making the rules more rigid will only yield a small benefit (See also Figure 1b). 
Therefore, understanding what the regulator or policy maker values from CNIOs is key 
to the balance between rules-based and risk-based regulation.  
 Cultural attitudes vary and this can have a significant impact on how firms and CNIOs 
react to security regulation, or its absence. In some jurisdictions with a risk-based 
regulatory system, CNIOs respond in a collaborative manner with the regulator and 
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government agencies to develop a security posture that all buy into. There are 
countries where CNIOs and firms in general choose to do very little in security with 
similar risk-based regulations in place. This is causing regulators to re-evaluate their 
approach in such countries, particularly in the EU. 
Many security leaders involved in this work thought that a mixed regulatory response could 
be implemented. Specifically, rules could apply to CNIOs that were less security mature and 
CNIOs above a certain maturity threshold (i.e. those with an established risk management and 
mitigation framework) would be subject to a risk-based regulatory framework. In this way, 
the rules-based regulation would bring up less mature organisations above the bar and the 
risk-based regulation would allow mature organisations to innovate and lead the industry.  
Identifying the maturity threshold is an interesting issue for future work. 
7. Acknowledgements 
This work has been partly funded by the European Union’s 7th Framework Programme under 
grant agreement no 285223 - SECONOMICS (www.seconomics.org). 
8. Bibliography 
                                                        
1 FBI, “Internet crime report 2012,” Internet Crime Complaint Center, Tech. Rep., 2013 
2 J. Franklin, A. Perrig, V. Paxson, and S. Savage, “An inquiry into the nature and causes of the 
wealth of internet miscreants,” in Proc. of ACM Conf. on Comp. and Comm. Security (CCS-07), 
pp. 375– 388. 2007. 
3 N. Provos, P. Mavrommatis, M. A. Rajab, and F. Monrose, “All your iframes point to us,” in 
Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 1–15. 2008. 
4 National Institute of Standards and Technology. "Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity." 2014. 
5 E. Knapp, “Industrial network security: securing critical infrastructure networks for Smart 
Grid, SCADA, and other industrial control systems.” Elsevier. 2011. 
6 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security. “Protecting Industrial 
Control Systems - Recommendations for Europe and Member”. 2011 
7 J. Hirshleifer, “From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” 
Public Choice, 41(3):371-386. 
8 N. Fultz and J. Grossklags. “Blue versus red: Towards a model of distributed security attacks.” 
In Proc. of Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC’09), pages 167–183. Springer Verlag, 
LNCS 5628. 2009. 
9 H. Cavusoglu, and J. Zhang. “Security patch management: Share the burden or share the 
damage.” Management Science 54(4):657–670.   2008. 
10 A. Arora, R. Telang, and H. Xu. “Optimal policy for software vulnerability disclosure.” 
Management Science 54(4):642–656. 2008. 
11 M. Cremonini, and D. Nizovtsev. “Risks and benefits of signalling information system 
characteristics to strategic attackers. J. of Management Inf. Sys. 26(3):241–274. 2010. 
 
Submitted to IEEE Security and Privacy 
 
12 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
12 T.Baker, and S.J. Griffith. “Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the 
Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Market.” Chicago Law Review, Vol. 74, p. 487. 2007 
13 J. Tirole. “The Theory of Industrial Organization,” MIT Press. 1988. 
14 H. Averch, and L. Johnson "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint". American 
Economic Review 52 (5):1052–1069. 1962. 
15 Crawford, S. E. S.  and E. Ostrom. “A Grammar of Institutions.” The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 89, No. 3., pp. 582-600. 1995 
16 K. Binmore. “Natural Justice.” Open University Press. 2011. 
